demonstrates that Minnesota's power of eminent domain should be restricted by the limitations imposed by the Northwest Ordinance by analogy to limitations the Northwest Ordinance has placed on the taxing power. And Part IV buttresses the analysis of the preceding sections by underscoring that the rights guaranteed by the Northwest Ordinance must also be regarded as among the unenumerated rights guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution. Taken together, this article will empower Minnesotans finally to claim their territorial birthright as a matter of lawthe constitutional limitation of the power of eminent domain to public exigencies.
I.
The Minnesota Constitution Should be Read in Pari Materia with the Northwest Ordinance.
The Northwest Ordinance expressly contemplates that the "fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty" it protects shall be fixed and established "as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory." 3 Although the Northwest Ordinance preceded the U.S. Constitution by two years, this fact does not relegate the ordinance to a mere historical document. Congress expressly reenacted the Ordinance by statute shortly after the Constitution was ratified, pursuant to its power to regulate the Territories under Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution. 4 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently held on numerous occasions that the Northwest Ordinance is not binding on the "internal affairs" of states carved out of the Northwest Territory once they were admitted to the union (to the extent the Ordinance is repugnant to the state constitution). 5 This precedent, however, occasionally vacillated.
3 Mary Jane Morrison, The Minnesota State Constitution 3-4 (2002) . 4 "An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the river Ohio," Stat. I, Chap. VIII (August 7, 1789) 5 Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 120 (1921) ("To the extent that it pertained to internal affairs, the Ordinance of 1787-notwithstanding its contractual form-was no more than a regulation of territory belonging to the United States, and was superseded by the admission of the State of Illinois into the Union"); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 217-18 (1917) ("The regulation, although embracing provisions of the Ordinance declared to be unalterable unless by common consent, had no further force in Iowa after its admission as a State and
For example, as late as 1901, one Supreme Court Justice observed: " [t] he opinion has been expressed that the ordinance of 1787 became inoperative and a nullity on the adoption of the Constitution while, on the other hand, it has been said that the ordinance of 1787 was 'the most solemn of all engagements,' and became a part of the Constitution of the United States by reason of the sixth article." 6 The uneasiness evident from this observation may relate to the unspoken fact that the Northwest Ordinance was first deemed non-binding almost immediately after fugitive slaves began invoking the anti-slavery provisions of the Northwest Ordinance, 7 the adoption of a state constitution, than other acts of Congress for the government of the Territory. All were superseded by the state constitution."); Cincinnati v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 401, 406-07 (1912) ("But the ordinance of 1787 as an instrument limiting the powers of government of the Northwest Territory, and declaratory of certain fundamental principles which must find place in the organic law of States to be carved out of that Territory, ceased to be, in itself, obligatory upon such States from and after their admission into the Union as States, except in so far as adopted by such States and made a part of the law thereof"); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573 (1911) ("when a new state is admitted into the Union, it is so admitted with all of the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction which pertain to the original States, and that such powers may not be constitutionally diminished, impaired or shorn away by any conditions, compacts or stipulations embraced in the act under which the new State came into the Union, which would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional legislation after admission"); Sands v. Manistee River Improv. Co., 123 U.S. 288, 295-96 (1887) ("The Ordinance of 1787 was passed a year and some months before the Constitution of the United States went into operation. Its framers, and the Congress of the confederation which passed it, evidently considered that the principles and declaration of rights and privileges expressed in its articles would always be of binding obligation upon the people of the territory . . . And for many years after the adoption of the Constitution, its provisions were treated by various acts of Congress as in force, except as modified by such acts. In some of the acts organizing portions of the territory under separate territorial governments, it is declared that the rights and privileges granted by the ordinance are secured to the inhabitants of those territories. Yet from the very conditions on which the States formed out of that territory were admitted into the Union, the provisions of the ordinance became inoperative except as adopted by them . . . Michigan, on her admission, became, therefore, entitled to and possessed of all the rights of sovereignty and dominion which belonged to the original States"); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 159 (1886) ("The articles of confederation ceased to exist upon the adoption of the federal constitution; and the ordinance of 1787, like all acts of congress for the government of the territories, had no force in any state after its admission into the Union under that constitution"); Escanaba & Lake Michigan Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1883) ("The ordinance was passed July 13, 1787, one year and nearly eight months before the constitution took effect; and although it appears to have been treated afterwards as in force in the territory . . . its provisions could not control the authority and powers of the state after her admission. Whatever the limitation upon her powers as a government while in a territorial condition, whether from the ordinance of 1787 or the legislation of congress, it ceased to have any operative force, except as voluntarily adopted by her after she became a state of the Union"); cf. Donahey v. Edmondson, 105 N.E. 269, 274 (Oh. 1913) ("It appears after diligent search that upon this question there is no conflict of authority, either state or federal . . . the authorities are uniform in support of the proposition that the Ordinance of 1787 was entirely superseded by the respective Constitutions of the several states carved out of this territory when such states were admitted into the Union. Any other construction would lead to the conclusion that the states of the Northwest Territory are restricted and limited by provisions other than those contained in the federal constitution, and thereby deprived of power essential to their equality with the other states"). 6 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 320-21 (1901) 9 Thus, it appears that the earliest decisions deeming the Constitution of the United States, have been the established law within this territory ever since the Ordinance was passed; and hence the Ordinance itself is sometimes spoken of as still in force. But these provisions owed their legal validity and force, after the Constitution was adopted and while the territorial government continued, to the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, which adopted and continued the Ordinance of 1787, and carried its provisions into execution, with some modifications, which were necessary to adapt its form of government to the new Constitution. And in the States since formed in the territory, these provisions, so far as they have been preserved, own their validity and authority to the Constitution of the United States, and the constitutions and laws of the respective States, and not to the authority of the Ordinance of the old Confederation. As we have already said, it ceased to be in force upon the adoption of the Constitution, and cannot now be the source of jurisdiction of any description in this court"); Northwest Ordinance "non-binding" deviated from stare decisis for the purpose of protecting the institution of slavery. It is no wonder that unease with these decisions persisted after the Civil War and the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Despite its dubious origins, the U.S. Supreme Court's long-standing precedent rejecting the binding nature of the Northwest Ordinance is probably beyond reconsideration at this time.
But there is a modern trend of Supreme Court precedent that looks favorably on the Northwest
Ordinance for purposes of supplementing textual constitutional interpretation. 10 Mirroring that trend, a strong argument can be made that the Minnesota Bill of Rights should be read in pari materia with the robust conception of property rights protected by the Northwest Ordinance.
When used as an adverb, in pari materia means " [l] oosely, in conjunction with," and when used as an adjective, it means "[o]n the same subject; relating to the same matter."
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According to the Minnesota Supreme Court:
When construing statutes relating to the same subject matter, we apply the doctrine of pari materia, as we have previously noted: 'Statutes relating to the same subject are presumed to be imbued with the same spirit and to have been passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all existing legislation on the subject and regarded by the lawmakers as being parts of a connected whole. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to same matter or subject even though some are specific and some general and even though they have not been enacted simultaneously and do not refer to each other expressly. Where two acts in pari materia are construed together and one contains provisions omitted from the other, the omitted provisions will be applied in the proceeding under the act 92, 96-97 (1903) (stating it "has been the policy of our people, from the organization of the territory to the present time, to encourage and by all proper means assist in the support and maintenance of educational institutions. Such was the policy of the federal government prior to the organization of the state, for it was enacted by article 3, Ordinance of 1787, providing for the government of the Northwest Territory, of which Minnesota formed a part, that 'religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.' The policy of our own people is shown both by territorial and state legislation, for we find upon our statute books numerous enactments exempting such institutions from taxation . . . In construing the section of the Constitution under consideration, the spirit of the times when it was adopted, as shown by the attitude of the territorial legislature and the people, should be infused into it"); Nelson v. Stryker Seminary, 53 N.W. 1133, 1134 (Minn. 1893) (justifying tax exemption as follows: "[b]y the ordinance of 1787, it was declared (article 3:) 'Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged.' In recognition of this principle or obligation, the legislature of the territory of Minnesota, by chapter 12, § 4, Rev. St. 1851, provided that 'the personal property of all literary, benevolent, charitable, and scientific institutions incorporated within this territory, and such real estate belonging to such institutions as shall be actually occupied for the purposes for which they were incorporated,' shall be exempt. The same policy is manifested by the constitution, in which, by article 9, § 3, it is provided that 'laws shall be passed taxing all real and personal property; but public schoolhouses, academies, colleges, universities, and all seminaries of learning, shall, by general laws, be exempt from taxation.'"). v. Peacock, 217 Minn. 399, 404-405 (1944); State v. Bishop Seabury Mission, 90 Minn. 92, 96-97 (1903) (stating it "has been the policy of our people, from the organization of the territory to the present time, to encourage and by all proper means assist in the support and maintenance of educational institutions. Such was the policy of the federal government prior to the organization of the state, for it was enacted by article 3, Ordinance of 1787, providing for the government of the Northwest Territory, of which Minnesota formed a part, that 'religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.' The policy of our own people is shown both by territorial and state legislation, for we find upon our statute books numerous enactments exempting such institutions from taxation . . . In construing the section of the Constitution under consideration, the spirit of the times when it was adopted, as shown by the attitude of the territorial legislature and the people, should be infused into it . . ."); Nelson v. Stryker Seminary, 53 N.W. 1133 , 1134 (Minn. 1893 ) (justifying tax exemption as follows: "[b]y the ordinance of 1787, it was declared (article 3:) 'Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged.' In recognition of this principle or obligation, the legislature of the territory of Minnesota, by chapter 12, § 4, Rev. St. 1851, provided that 'the personal property of all literary, benevolent, charitable, and scientific institutions incorporated within this territory, and such real estate belonging to such institutions as shall be actually occupied for the purposes for which they were incorporated,' shall be exempt. The same policy is manifested by the constitution, in which, by article 9, § 3, it is provided that "laws shall be passed taxing . . . all real and personal property; but public schoolhouses, academies, colleges, universities, and all seminaries of learning, . . . shall, by general laws, be exempt from taxation.'").
status "by law." The argument was made that since the state legislature did not confirm or adopt
Hamline's tax-exempt status through subsequent legislation, Hamline was no longer tax-exempt.
In response to these arguments, the Court nevertheless upheld "Hamline's freedom from the general burden of taxation" based on its territorial charter and provisions of Minnesota Constitution, which stated " [t] hat no inconvenience may arise by reason of a change from a territorial to a permanent state government, it is declared that all rights, actions, prosecutions, judgments, claims and contracts, as well of individuals as of bodies corporate, shall continue as if no change had taken place." The Court then adopted word-for-word the holding of the 1903 case of Bishop Seabury:
[It] has been the policy of our people, from the organization of the territory to the present time, to encourage and by all proper means assist in the support and maintenance of educational institutions. Such was the policy of the federal government prior to the organization of the state, for it was enacted by article 3, Ordinance of 1787, providing for the government of the Northwest Territory, of which Minnesota formed a part, that 'religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.' The policy of our own people is shown both by territorial and state legislation, for we find upon our statute books numerous enactments exempting such institutions from taxation . . . In construing the section of the Constitution under consideration, the spirit of the times when it was adopted, as shown by the attitude of the territorial legislature and the people, should be infused into it.
The holding of Bishop Seabury, in turn, reflected the earlier holding of the 1893 case of Nelson, in which the Court upheld the tax exempt status of Stryker Seminary, stating:
By the ordinance of 1787, it was declared (article 3:) 'Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged.' In recognition of this principle or obligation, the legislature of the territory of Minnesota, by chapter 12, § 4, Rev. St. 1851, provided that 'the personal property of all literary, benevolent, charitable, and scientific institutions incorporated within this territory, and such real estate belonging to such institutions as shall be actually occupied for the purposes for which they were incorporated,' shall be exempt. The same policy is manifested by the constitution, in which, by article 9, § 3, it is provided that "laws shall be passed taxing . . . all real and personal property; but public schoolhouses, academies, colleges, universities, and all seminaries of learning, . . . shall, by general laws, be exempt from taxation.'
Like the power to tax, the power of eminent domain has been described as a sovereign power that is constrained only to the extent of the constitution. 25 Also, like the territorial charters of Hamline University, Stryker Seminary, and Bishop Seabury Mission, a strong argument can be made that the rights protected by the Ordinance were expressly incorporated into territorial laws and the Minnesota Constitution by positive law. Accordingly, if territorial laws granting tax exemption combined with the policy of the Northwest Ordinance warranted constraining the power to tax under the Minnesota Constitution, 26 then certainly territorial laws that expressly adopted the rights protected by the Northwest Ordinance warrant restricting the power of eminent domain by supplementing the takings clause with the "public exigency" and "common preservation" restrictions of the Ordinance's robust conception of private property.
IV. The Rights Protected by the Northwest Ordinance Are Among the Unenumerated Rights Protected by the Minnesota Bill of Rights.
Justice Simonett's concurrence in Hershberger 27 recently linked the Northwest
Ordinance to Section 16 of the Minnesota Bill of Rights. Specifically, Justice Simonett argued:
25 Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515 (1866) (observing "[t] o take land of the citizen for public use by the State when necessary, is an essential incident to sovereignty. The right of eminent domain is not conferred by the constitution; but, if affected at all, is limited thereby, and only to the extent of the limitation can the citizen obtain any redress."). 26 The relevant part of the Minnesota Constitution states that educational establishments shall be tax exempt as provided "by law." Ordinarily, this would suggest that for an educational establishment to avail itself of tax-exempt status, the legislature would have to affirmatively grant such status by passing legislation. But the Supreme Court of Minnesota has repeatedly held that even where the legislature has not passed legislation recognizing the tax exempt status of an educational institution, the policy of the Northwest Ordinance and the Minnesota Constitution's general incorporation of territorial laws still warranted recognizing the tax exempt status of institutions that were given such status by territorial charter. In other words, the Court restricted the sovereign power to tax based on: a) the Constitution's express incorporation of territorial rights and laws; and b) the policy of the Northwest Ordinance favoring the establishment of educational institutions. Similarly, a strong argument can be made that the sovereign power of eminent domain should be restricted based on: a) the Constitution's express incorporation of territorial rights and laws, which included the Northwest Ordinance; and b) the Northwest Ordinance's textual protection of robust property rights. 27 State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Minn.1990 ) (referring to Northwest Ordinance in discussing scope of the right to religious freedom under Minnesota Constitution). Northwest Ordinance is, after all, the Magna Carta of the Midwest.
Conclusion
As shown above, the Northwest Ordinance's robust conception of property rights should supplement the Minnesota Bill of Rights pursuant to the doctrine of in pari materia and restrict the use of eminent domain to circumstances of "public exigency" where "necessary" for the "common preservation." Notably, persuasive foreign precedent also supports this argument. an equal footing with the original states,' when the Ordinance of 1787 and the organic act as well, which were adapted only to the territorial condition of Wisconsin, became obsolete and ceased to have any operative force, except as voluntarily adopted by her after she became a state of the Union. Though obsolete, these acts may be properly regarded as in pari materia, and helpful and of historical value, in construing secs. 3, 4, and 5 of art. IV of the constitution, which came in to take the place of the provisions briefly quoted") (citations omitted 'n v. Board of Edu., 138 N.E. 865, 870 (Oh. 1922) (holding "[t] he state of Ohio is a part of the old Northwest Territory and the ordinance of the Confederate Congress, passed July 13, 1787, known as the Ordinance of 1787, providing for the government of that territory and for its division into states to be admitted into the Union, in Article III thereof, enacted: 'Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.' This provision was just as obligatory upon the future policies and future governments of the territory as was that provision of Article VI thereof, which provided that: 'There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.' The obligations of that ordinance were fully recognized by the framers of the original constitution of 1802, and it was said in the preamble to that constitution, in part: 'We, the people of the eastern division of the territory of the United States, northwest of the river Ohio, having the right of admission into the general government, as a member of the Union, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, the ordinance of Congress of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the law of Congress, entitled 'An act to enable the people of the eastern division of the territory of the United States, northwest of the river Ohio, to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such state into the Union, on an equal footing with the original states, and for other purposes;' do ordain and establish the following constitution or form of government. . . . All the statutes above quoted from are in pari materia with the sections under construction"); Steinglass and Scarcelli, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION 7 (2004) (observing "[u] ltimately, both the U.S. and Ohio Supreme Courts held that state constitutions superseded the Ordinance, but the fundamental rights protected by the Northwest Ordinance, including the prohibition against slavery, became part of the 1802 Ohio Constitution and remain part of the current Ohio Constitution").
